[ PERSPECTIVE ]05 Nov 202611 min
Unmanned Surface Vehicles & the Strait of Hormuz
At Hormuz the roles reversed. The stronger navy got the most out of sea drones, and its most consequential drone job was clearing mines.
Part 2 of 3. Part 1, Unmanned Surface Vehicles & the Black Sea, sets out the Ukrainian record. Part 3, Taiwan's Unmanned Deep Strike Challenge, takes the lessons to the Taiwan Strait.
In the Black Sea, a country with almost no navy used sea drones to push a fleet out of its home port. Since the United States and Israel began striking Iran on 28 February, the Strait of Hormuz has run the experiment the other way. Iran has closed the strait mainly with missiles, aerial drones and the threat of mines. The United States has used sea drones for patrol, rescue, one port strike and, above all, the slow work of finding mines.
The war has moved in phases, according to the Congressional Research Service:1 a ceasefire from 7 April, an agreement signed on 17 June that ended the first US blockade, renewed US strikes from 26 June and heavier ones from 7 July, and a second blockade from 14 July.
HORMUZ CONFLICT PHASES, 2026

Strikes from 28 February; ceasefire 7 April; agreement 17 June; renewed strikes 26 June and 7 July; second blockade from 14 July.
Source: Congressional Research Service; US Central Command; The War Zone; The Guardian.
01Iran's drone boats: a minor weapon
On 1 March an explosive boat hit the tanker MKD Vyom about 50 nautical miles off Muscat.2 The UK's maritime trade office recorded it as a sea-drone attack, and Oman reported a crew member killed. Suspected cases followed off Kuwait on 5 March, where a small craft was seen leaving after an explosion, and near Basra on 11 March, where two fuel tankers burned and a crew member died.3 By 26 March Reuters reported that Iran had used sea drones against tankers at least twice.4 No confirmed Iranian sea-drone strike on a commercial ship has been reported since.
The boats are simple. Imagery of an underground Revolutionary Guard base shows a small interceptor with twin outboard motors,5 a cockpit and a mast. The analyst H I Sutton reads it as crewed for part of the mission and likely commanded from another boat during the attack. Nothing reported points to satellite links, missile mounts or the drone-launching payloads Ukraine fitted to its boats.
Geography explains most of the gap. The strait is 21 nautical miles (39 kilometers) wide at its narrowest, so shore-based missiles and drones already reach every lane, and a drone boat adds little to weapons that cover the whole target area from land. US air superiority made small-boat launches risky. Iran's aim has also been to coerce traffic through restricted zones, which mines and missiles do well enough. That reading is an inference: absence from open reporting does not prove the boats have stopped.
THE STRAIT, SCHEMATIC

The 21-nautical-mile narrows, the southern route near Oman, and the two strike locations.
Source: PalBerg schematic; UKMTO and JMIC advisory notes, September 2026.
The Houthi record in the Red Sea shows what such boats do when they get close. A Houthi drone boat crippled the bulk carrier Tutor in June 2024 before a missile attack and its sinking.6 In July 2025 two drone boats helped sink Magic Seas,7 alongside a missile, small arms and grenades. They are lethal against slow, undefended hulls. Getting close is the limit.
02The port strike: the Black Sea lesson holds, against a soft target
On 12 July three Saronic Corsair boats struck a submarine and ship-maintenance dock at Bandar Abbas, detonating beside what footage suggests was a Ghadir-class midget submarine. US Central Command called it the first American combat use of sea drones.8 New Atlas reported that the boats approached from different directions under autonomous control;9 Central Command has not disclosed the route or the control mode.
The raid matches Ukraine's strikes on Sevastopol and Novorossiysk: a stationary target at a known position. The conditions were easier. Forces News, geolocating the target, judged that the approach would have been easy to defend had Iran been prepared,10 and the strike came inside a larger air package against a navy already largely destroyed. Bandar Abbas proves the concept for US forces. It says little about sea drones against an alert, layered harbor defense of the kind Russia built at Novorossiysk.
Corsair is also a different class of weapon from Ukraine's boats. It is a 24-foot (7.3-meter) craft rated at more than 1,000 nautical miles, 35 knots and 1,000 pounds of payload. It went from unveiling in October 2024 to combat in July 2026, about 21 months, under a Navy production agreement signed in May 2025 and announced in December,11 whose ceiling now stands at $458 million. Its unit cost is reported at about $1 million,12 with open-source estimates up to $1.1 million; no official price exists. That is roughly four times the $220,000 to $275,000 publicly estimated for a Ukrainian Magura or Sea Baby. With damage at Bandar Abbas unquantified, no cost exchange can yet be calculated.
03Mine clearance: the most consequential drone mission
In September 2025 the Navy decommissioned its last four Avenger-class minesweepers in Bahrain,13 shipping them home in January. It planned to replace them with littoral combat ships, small coastal warships, carrying unmanned mine-hunting kits. Iran's mining of the strait tested that replacement in war.
The search is now largely robotic.14 Reports drawing on the Wall Street Journal and Reuters say that drone boats towing sonar scan columns about 100 feet wide, underwater drones search in a pattern, and helicopters scan near the surface. Divers do much of the destruction. A lost drone is replaced from stock, and that is the case for the approach.
Speed is the problem. Search takes weeks; neutralizing and confirming each contact takes longer. A classified briefing to Congress reportedly put full clearance at six months, the Washington Post said, citing three unnamed officials,15 an estimate the Pentagon later disputed. The Financial Times reports a covert four-month effort by drone boats,16 submersibles and Navy SEAL divers, after which shipowners believed the southern half of the strait near Oman may have been cleared but were less sure of the rest. On 19 September Central Command declared the primary transit lanes clear; the joint maritime information center still rated the threat severe five days later.17 Drones made clearance possible without minesweepers, at a pace measured in months.
04The fight over the drones
In September the drones themselves became targets. Most individual claims are disputed. The pattern holds across them.
- 8 September. The Revolutionary Guard said it captured a US underwater drone at the strait's entrance.18 Central Command said the older Anduril Dive-LD had malfunctioned more than a day earlier and carried no sensitive data. The recovery is confirmed; how Iran came by it is not.
- 10 September. Iran released footage of a burning boat that Iranian media and analysts identified as a Saildrone Explorer. A US official said all Saildrones were accounted for.19 Disputed.
- 14 September. Central Command said Iranian small boats tried to take a US surface drone and that it responded with force; US officials said two boats were destroyed,20 and an anonymously sourced account said an American drone fired the missiles. Iranian local officials said the boats were fishing craft. The engagement is confirmed; the boats' identity is disputed.
The properties that make a surveillance drone useful make it easy to take. A Saildrone moves at one to three knots, stays at sea for a year, and lists at about $2,670 per mission day on a 2022 federal price schedule.21 A seizure costs Iran little and yields propaganda and possibly technology; Iran briefly towed one Saildrone and detained two in 2022. The US response of force risks civilian casualties if the boats were fishermen. The Black Sea has not produced this problem at the same scale. Russia is reported to base attack drone boats in Crimea, but not to keep a persistent surveillance presence off Ukraine's coast for Ukraine to contest.
05Judgments
The port-raid lesson holds, but only against a degraded defender. Bandar Abbas shows US sea drones can reach and hit a naval base; it shows nothing yet about a prepared one. Moderate to high confidence.
Mine clearance is the most consequential sea-drone mission in a mined chokepoint, and it runs in months. At Hormuz the drones carried the search while divers did much of the neutralizing, and traffic answered to missiles, the blockade and insurance as much as to mines. A Chinese blockade or invasion would almost certainly involve mines around Taiwan's ports, and Hormuz suggests that clearing the main lanes by drone takes a season. That argues for mine-clearance drones positioned in the Western Pacific before a crisis. Moderate confidence.
Persistent drone sensors invite seizure below the threshold of war. China seized a US underwater glider in the South China Sea in 2016. Drones watching a Taiwan quarantine should be expected to draw the same treatment, and to need escorts or a settled rule for responding. Moderate confidence.
Mass remains untested. Neither side massed boats: three Corsairs in one strike, a handful of Iranian boats in March. The Black Sea finding that salvos beat single platforms has not been tried at Hormuz. High confidence on the observation.
Six indicators would move these judgments:
- A confirmed Iranian sea-drone strike after March, especially a swarm or an attack on a warship
- Further US sea-drone strikes against defended ports
- An Iranian display or claimed reverse-engineering of a captured US drone
- Escorts or armed overwatch for US surveillance drones, or a stated rule for responding to seizures
- Independent confirmation that the lanes Central Command declared clear on 19 September are safe, such as a lower threat rating or a return of unescorted traffic
- Chinese attempts to seize or harass US or Taiwanese drones in the Western Pacific
The gap is mine-clearance throughput. Nothing public says how many lanes a month drones can clear in contested water. Ukraine showed how quickly sea drones can take the sea away from a navy. Hormuz is showing how slowly they give it back.
Notes
- Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran, R48887, updated 18 September 2026, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48887.html. ↑
- The War Zone, Iranian Kamikaze Drone Boat Makes First Successful Strike of War, March 2026, https://www.twz.com/news-features/iranian-kamikaze-drone-boat-makes-first-successful-strike-of-war. ↑
- Al Jazeera, Five Vessels Attacked amid Reports of Iranian Drone Boats, Sea Mines, 12 March 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/12/five-vessels-attacked-amid-reports-of-iranian-drone-boats-sea-mines. ↑
- Reuters, US Deploys Uncrewed Drone Boats in Conflict with Iran, 26 March 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-deploys-uncrewed-drone-boats-conflict-with-iran-2026-03-26/. ↑
- Covert Shores, Iranian IRGC Show Uncrewed Explosive Boat (USV), 11 March 2026, https://www.hisutton.com/IRGC-USV.html. ↑
- US Central Command, June 12 US Central Command Update, 12 June 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/3805237/june-12-us-central-command-update/. ↑
- Reuters, Maritime Security Firms Launch Mission to Save Crew of Greek Vessel Hit by Houthis, 9 July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/maritime-security-firms-launch-mission-save-crew-greek-vessel-hit-by-houthis-2025-07-09/. ↑
- Military Times, Sea Drones Strike Iranian Port in Combat First for US Navy, 13 July 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/07/13/sea-drones-strike-iranian-port-in-combat-first-for-us-navy/. ↑
- New Atlas, David Szondy, Watch: US Makes Historic Drone Boat Strike in Iran, 13 July 2026, https://newatlas.com/military/us-historic-drone-boat-strike-iran/. ↑
- Forces News, Richard White, US Deploys Sea Drones to Attack an Iranian Naval Base and Ship Maintenance Facility, 15 July 2026, https://www.forcesnews.com/technology/weapons-and-kit/us-deploys-sea-drones-attack-iranian-naval-base-and-ship-maintenance. ↑
- gCaptain, US Navy Awards Saronic $392M Contract for Autonomous Vessels in Under 12-Month Turnaround, December 2025, https://gcaptain.com/u-s-navy-awards-saronic-392m-contract-for-autonomous-vessels-in-under-12-month-turnaround/. ↑
- Austin American-Statesman, Karoline Leonard and Brandon Lingle, Pete Hegseth Visits Austin Startup Behind Autonomous Military Vessels, 18 September 2026, via Yahoo News, https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/pete-hegseth-visits-austin-startup-223733721.html. ↑
- US Naval Forces Central Command, US Navy Decommissions Avenger-class Mine Countermeasures Ships in Bahrain, September 2025, https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/4314606/us-navy-decommissions-avenger-class-mine-countermeasures-ships-in-bahrain/. ↑
- Reuters, How the US Could Clear Mines in the Strait of Hormuz, 16 April 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/how-us-could-clear-mines-strait-hormuz-2026-04-16/; Marine Insight, U.S Navy Sends Robot Systems To Clear Iranian Mines In Strait Of Hormuz, 20 April 2026, citing the Wall Street Journal, https://www.marineinsight.com/u-s-navy-sends-robot-systems-to-clear-iranian-mines-in-strait-of-hormuz. ↑
- Washington Post, 22 April 2026, as reported by AFP, Pentagon Denies Clearing Hormuz Strait Mines Will Take Six Months, 23 April 2026, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/pentagon-denies-clearing-hormuz-strait-mines-will-take-six-months. ↑
- Financial Times, September 2026, as reported by Hromadske, US Navy Carried Out Secret Four-Month Mine-Clearing Operation in Strait of Hormuz, 7 September 2026, https://hromadske.ua/en/world/270628-us-navy-carried-out-secret-four-month-mine-clearing-operation-in-strait-of-hormuz-ft. ↑
- UKMTO and Joint Maritime Information Center, JMIC Advisory Note, Update 099, 24 September 2026, https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-099-jmic-advisory-note-24-september.pdf. ↑
- Reuters via Baird Maritime, Iran Says It Captured US Underwater Drone; Pentagon Cites Glitch, 9 September 2026, https://www.bairdmaritime.com/security/naval/unmanned-naval-systems/iran-says-it-captured-us-underwater-drone-pentagon-cites-glitch. ↑
- Military Times, Claire Barrett, US Refutes Claims That Iran Captured Saildrone USV, 11 September 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/industry/techwatch/2026/09/11/us-refutes-claims-that-iran-captured-saildrone-usv/; Autonocion, Chema Bonilla Díaz, report on the burning Saildrone footage, 23 September 2026, https://www.autonocion.com/us/drone-sailboat-burning-hormuz-missiles/. ↑
- Axios, Scoop: U.S. Attacked Iranian Boats Trying to Seize Navy Drone, 15 September 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/09/15/us-iran-boats-navy-drone-strait-hormuz. ↑
- GSA Advantage, Saildrone federal price schedule, contract 47QTCA22D0097, 2022, https://www.gsaadvantage.gov/ref_text/47QTCA22D0097/0ZVH4G.3VLTZ4_47QTCA22D0097_SAILDRONETSCSJUNE.PDF. ↑
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