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[ PERSPECTIVE ]13 Nov 202619 min

The 120th Congress, Defense Tech and Ukraine

Democrats take both chambers in January without the votes to override a veto. Their influence on defense tech and Ukraine will run through appropriations conditions, oversight and a smaller reconciliation bill.

Jesse Nuese and Luc Hillion
13 Nov 2026

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Contents 19 min

01Executive Analysis

Democrats take both chambers in January but hold neither the 60 Senate votes needed to break a filibuster nor the 67 needed to override a veto. Their leverage over defense tech runs through appropriations: the conditions written into spending bills, the oversight hearings that follow, and the size of any reconciliation bill. The Pentagon requested $350 billion through reconciliation, carrying most new money for drones, AI, Golden Dome and Office of Strategic Capital lending; the House budget resolution allows $60 billion. The Pentagon runs on a stopgap budget until December 11.

Assessed: Awards on new FY27 lines are likely to slip well into 2027, and companies with political ties to the administration should expect scrutiny. Support for Ukraine is likely to grow, slowly, and remains exposed to a veto.

022026 Midterm Results

Democrats will control both chambers in January. In the Senate they flipped eight seats and, with two independents who caucus with them, hold 55 seats to 44 after Mississippi was called on November 11; one seat remains uncalled. In the House they hold 255 seats to 168 with 12 races still uncalled, close to their largest majority in two decades. Counts are the Associated Press's as of November 12.

The majority has limits. Fifty-five senators are five short of the 60 needed to break a filibuster and twelve short of the 67 needed to override a veto. An override would need roughly 35 House Republicans and 12 Senate Republicans. Most bills will still need bipartisan support.1

For defense tech, the new majority matters less for whether defense spending falls than for where it is spent. Democrats will exert most of their influence through appropriations: writing the bills, attaching conditions to the money, and calling companies and officials to testify.

03State of Play

This note uses "the Pentagon" for the Department of Defense, styled the Department of War since September 2025. Appendix A is a primer on how defense money moves.

Reconciliation is where defense tech is most exposed. On top of $1.15 trillion in discretionary funding, the administration requested $350 billion in April through reconciliation, planned solely for the Pentagon.2 Reconciliation needs only a simple Senate majority, but both chambers must first adopt a budget resolution. Only the House has done so, and its resolution provides $60 billion for defense.3 The Senate deferred a vote on its version, which would provide the same.4 CSIS expects any final reconciliation bill to land closer to $60 billion.5

Most of the $350 billion relevant to defense tech sits in two sections, Next Generation Technology and Autonomy and the Defense Industrial Base. Together they total $215.6 billion, about 62 percent.6 The rest goes to munitions, Golden Dome (the administration's planned homeland missile-defense shield), housing and facilities, and existing aircraft such as the F-35.

Reconciliation Gap View full size (opens in a new tab)

Pentagon reconciliation money for FY27: the April request, the two sections that carry most defense-tech money, and what the House budget resolution allows. Drawn to scale.

Source: Department of War, FY2027 Mandatory Budget Overview, April 2026; CSIS, 10 April and 28 October 2026.

The first section, Next Generation Technology and Autonomy, totals $102.5 billion in the initial request: $53.6 billion for Drone Dominance, run through the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), and $46 billion for sovereign AI infrastructure.7 Inside Drone Dominance, the largest lines are $16.9 billion for asset purchases and an industrial demand signal, and $14.4 billion for counter-drone systems.

The second, the $113.1 billion industrial base section, includes $23.6 billion of Defense Production Act purchases. These use loans, purchase commitments and agreements to expand domestic production and close shortfalls in space, air, ground and soldier systems.8 This money goes to suppliers and factories. A further $1.9 billion would modernize the Pentagon's acquisition system, meaning how it buys.9 Reconciliation was also meant to carry most of Golden Dome's FY27 funding: $17.5 billion in the request, including $4.5 billion for space programs and $4.1 billion for Missile Defense Agency R&D.10 The Pentagon has said it would fold reconciliation priorities into discretionary appropriations if the full request fails.11

Assessed: That shift forces a triage, and the items that move into the discretionary budget will show the Pentagon's real priorities.

Money already under contract keeps moving; new money slows. The Pentagon is running on a continuing resolution (CR), a stopgap law that funds the government at last year's levels until Congress passes full-year budgets or the CR expires on December 11, 2026.12 A CR restricts new starts and production increases, so the Pentagon cannot launch new programs or buy more of something than it did the year before.13 A January 2026 GAO study surveyed 74 acquisition programs (the Pentagon's projects to develop and buy weapons and systems) on the CRs of fiscal years 2022 through 2024. Thirty-six reported schedule effects, such as delayed contract awards or late delivery and fielding.14 A company waiting on a new FY27 funding line, or on a production ramp (an increase in how many units the Pentagon orders and the factory builds), should plan for awards to slip well into 2027.

The NDAA and appropriations are unlikely to pass in the lame duck. With 22 Senate and 20 House session days left after the midterms, CSIS warns that "passing full-year appropriations by the expiration of the current CR will be challenging." The NDAA, which the Senate has not yet advanced, faces the same calendar.15

The Iran war is a separate fight. The administration requested $67.1 billion in supplemental funding for the Pentagon.16 Gregory Meeks, the incoming chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), plans resolutions to "immediately terminate" the war.17 Under the War Powers Resolution, hostilities begun without congressional authorization must end within 60 days, extendable by 30 for withdrawal, unless Congress authorizes them. A resolution directing withdrawal would likely draw a veto that Democrats lack the votes to override.

Assessed: Democrats are unlikely to cut war funding, because voting against funding for deployed troops carries political risk ahead of 2028.

04HASC & SASC Leadership Changeover

Both incoming chairs back acquisition reform and cheaper, attritable systems, meaning systems designed and priced to be lost in use. Both have publicly criticized the Pentagon's current leadership.

Adam Smith, House Armed Services (HASC). Rep. Smith (D-WA) chaired the committee from 2019 to 2023.18 He co-wrote the SPEED Act, an acquisition reform bill, with Republican chair Mike Rogers, saying it "cuts through the red tape, encourages innovation."19 He voted against the House FY27 NDAA over what he called its "$1.6 trillion price tag."20 He wants more investment in low-cost munitions, uncrewed systems, and drone and missile defenses, and "an appropriate mix of high-end survivable systems and lower-cost attritable capabilities."21 On November 4 he named "sweetheart deals and favoritism" as an oversight priority.22

Jack Reed, Senate Armed Services (SASC). Sen. Reed (D-RI) has been the committee's senior Democrat on autonomy and on oversight of the secretary. In May 2026 he said "we have to build every system with the capacity and capability of being autonomous."23 He has called Golden Dome's reconciliation money "potentially a slush fund" and accused Secretary Hegseth of politicizing the force.24 In 2025 he pressed Hegseth to "immediately restart" munitions shipments to Ukraine.25 He supports SASC's FY27 NDAA, which he said in June 2026 "enhances oversight and accountability."26

05Procurement: reform holds, reporting expands

Acquisition reform has bipartisan roots, and most of it survives the handover. The Senate NDAA requires a report on progress toward making commercial solutions openings (CSOs, a fast-track solicitation for commercial technology) and other transaction agreements (OTAs, contracts outside standard federal acquisition rules) the default for software acquisitions.27 The House version lets portfolio acquisition executives, the officials who will manage groups of related programs, shift up to 10 percent of their R&D budget into procurement, the account that buys finished equipment.28 The Senate version also extends drone industrial base provisions so that subcomponents are not made in covered countries, chiefly China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.29

The change is in reporting. Under Senate Sec. 817, OTAs must be publicly reported like other contracts.30 The Senate bill also enforces an executive order limiting share buybacks and dividends at defense contractors. That is likely the largest point of divergence between the House and Senate bills.31

Right to repair is the other fight that reaches contractors directly. In June, HASC adopted an amendment from Rep. Maggie Goodlander (D-NH) giving the Pentagon more authority to repair and maintain its own equipment, and Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Tim Sheehy welcomed the "advancement of military right to repair" in the FY27 NDAA.32 Their Warrior Right to Repair Act would require contractors to give the Pentagon the technical data and materials needed to repair and maintain equipment.33 Similar provisions were stripped from the FY26 bill after opposition from industry groups and the largest prime contractors.34

06Ukraine

More support, on a slower clock. Democrats are assembling a security assistance package for Kyiv of about $15 billion, according to a House Foreign Affairs aide who spoke to the FT (single-sourced). Separately, 32 lawmakers from both parties, led by Rep. Jim Costa, asked Secretary Hegseth and Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought on November 9 to explain by November 30 why $400 million in FY2026 Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds was obligated only in the final days of the fiscal year, with delivery projected to run to FY2029.35 Melinda Haring, a senior adviser to the advocacy group Razom for Ukraine, says lawmakers are preparing FY27 NDAA amendments on sanctions enforcement, intelligence sharing and faster deliveries of air-defense interceptors.36 Any aid package remains exposed to a presidential veto.

Sanctions are the second front. Trump signed the Graham sanctions law on September 18, then waived many of its measures by executive order on October 16.37 An HFAC aide told the FT: "We're going to fix the Graham bill."38 Standalone Ukraine bills are still unlikely to become law. Kyiv's Republican champions, Thom Tillis, Mitch McConnell and Susan Collins, are leaving, and Democrats will need new Republican votes.39

For defense tech, the relevant provision is co-development. The Senate NDAA creates a Ukraine Strategic Defense Innovation Working Group to explore co-development, technology-transfer frameworks and drone advising.40

Assessed: Whether the working group survives into the final NDAA is a reasonable early read on Congress's appetite for broader Ukraine support over the next two years.

07Oversight: hearings become part of the market

The tools are strong. In the House, committee chairs may issue subpoenas unilaterally.41 A congressional subpoena is a legal demand for documents or testimony, and a company that resists without a legitimate basis risks a contempt vote or a criminal referral.42 In the Senate, Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), ranking member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) and its likely chair, has said Democrats will use PSI's subpoena power and that he would seek sworn testimony on the agreements law firms struck with the administration.43 Democrats may define "Administration corruption" broadly enough to reach entities that "made deals with the Administration," a standard that could extend to defense deals.44

Appropriations become an enforcement tool. Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.), expected to chair House Appropriations, says "we will build in guardrails in the appropriation bills." Conditions written into spending bills can carry the findings of an investigation into law.45

The Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) is a likely target. Congress codified the OSC in the fiscal 2024 NDAA, under the Biden administration, with loan and loan guarantee authority under 10 U.S.C. §149.46 The Pentagon requested about $20.2 billion for its credit program in FY27, against less than $1.5 billion in FY26.47 The FY27 request would support about $200 billion in loan capacity.48 The Pentagon announced plans in November 2025 to lend Vulcan Elements $620 million, about three months after 1789 Capital, the venture firm of Donald Trump Jr., took an undisclosed stake. ProPublica has reported that the White House intervened to secure the deal.49

Assessed: The scale of the OSC request makes it a natural oversight target, and the Vulcan loan is the most likely first case.

Leadership exposure. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is the most exposed official. Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), who lost his primary and will not return, filed articles of impeachment against Hegseth on November 9. The House blocked the motion the next day.50

Removal by the Senate would require 67 votes, meaning at least 12 Republicans.

Assessed: Hearings and resignations are more likely than a Senate conviction.

08What to watch

December 11 funding deadline. Whether Congress passes full-year appropriations or another CR.

Size of any reconciliation bill. The drone, AI, Golden Dome and OSC money sat in the $350 billion request; the House budget resolution allows $60 billion.51 Which items the Pentagon moves into the discretionary budget will show its real priorities.

NDAA fine print. Whether public reporting of OTA awards (Sec. 817), the limits on buybacks and dividends, and the right-to-repair language survive conference.

Oversight exposure. The Vulcan Elements loan shows that deals with political ties may draw subpoenas. Political connections are now a diligence item.

Ukraine. Support is likely to grow, slowly. The co-development working group is the first signal.

Intelligence gap. The Pentagon has not said how it would triage the reconciliation request into the discretionary budget. Until it does, exposure for any single program line cannot be assessed publicly.

09Appendix A: How defense money moves

The White House asks for money, Congress sets the rules (the NDAA) and writes the check (appropriations), and a stopgap pays the bills when the check is late.

The White House asks. Each year the president proposes what the Pentagon should get. For FY2027 the request is $1.5 trillion: $1.15 trillion in discretionary funding plus $350 billion to be passed through reconciliation.52

Discretionary funding. Money Congress must approve every year. Most defense spending works this way.

Reconciliation. A fast lane for budget bills. It passes with a simple Senate majority, so it avoids the 60-vote filibuster.53 It is limited to budget matters, and both chambers must first adopt a budget resolution that sets its size. The $350 billion is planned solely for the Pentagon, and the Pentagon's budget documents list it as mandatory funding because it would come from a reconciliation law, not the annual appropriations bills.54 It is a one-time request for FY2027 and exists only if reconciliation passes.

Discretionary versus mandatory. Discretionary money must be re-approved in appropriations bills every year. Mandatory money flows from other laws, which is why the Pentagon labels reconciliation funding mandatory even though it is a one-time FY2027 request.55

Appropriations: the check. The bills that give the Pentagon money to spend, one fiscal year at a time. The fiscal year starts October 1. Congress can attach conditions to the money, which is why the Democratic pen matters. Appropriations bills need 60 Senate votes.

The NDAA: the permission slip. The National Defense Authorization Act is the annual defense policy bill. It authorizes programs and sets spending levels, but it "does not provide funding."56 Acquisition rules, new offices and reporting requirements live here. It needs 60 Senate votes and has been enacted for 65 consecutive years.57 Each chamber writes its own version, and the two are merged into one bill in conference.

Continuing resolution (CR): autopilot. When appropriations are late, a CR provides temporary funding at roughly current levels.58 It restricts new programs and production increases, so new money slows.59 The current CR was signed September 2 and runs through December 11.60

Supplemental. Extra money outside the annual cycle, usually for a war or disaster, such as the $67.1 billion Iran request. It needs 60 Senate votes like other bills.

The lame duck. The stretch between the November election and the new Congress taking office in January, when the outgoing Congress still holds power.

10Notes

  1. Zoriana Katola, "Democrats Took Congress Overnight, but Ukraine Isn't Their Top-Three Priority: What Midterm Win Really Means for Kyiv," Euromaidan Press, November 4, 2026, https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/11/04/democrats-took-congress-overnight-but-ukraine-isnt-their-top-three-priority-what-midterm-win-really-means-for-kyiv. ↑
  2. Seamus P. Daniels, "Unpacking the $1.5 Trillion FY 2027 Defense Budget Topline," Critical Questions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 10, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-15-trillion-fy-2027-defense-budget-topline. ↑
  3. Seamus P. Daniels, "FY 2027 Defense Funding: Potential Post-Midterm Outcomes," Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 28, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fy-2027-defense-funding-potential-post-midterm-outcomes. ↑
  4. Daniels, "Post-Midterm Outcomes." ↑
  5. Daniels, "Post-Midterm Outcomes." ↑
  6. Department of War, Fiscal Year 2027 Mandatory Budget Overview (Washington, DC: Department of War, April 2026), https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/DoW_FY2027_Mandatory_Funding_Overview.pdf. ↑
  7. Department of War, Mandatory Budget Overview. ↑
  8. Department of War, Mandatory Budget Overview. ↑
  9. Department of War, Mandatory Budget Overview. ↑
  10. Valerie Insinna, "Republicans Have a Ticking Clock. What Can They Get Done on Defense?" Breaking Defense, November 5, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/11/republicans-have-a-ticking-clock-what-can-they-get-done-on-defense/; Department of War, Mandatory Budget Overview. ↑
  11. Ashley Roque, "With Reconciliation Uncertain, Pentagon Eyeing Plan to Retool FY27 Priorities with Congress," Breaking Defense, September 10, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/09/with-reconciliation-uncertain-pentagon-eyeing-plan-to-retool-fy27-priorities-with-congress/. ↑
  12. Marcia Smith, "House Clears FY2027 CR, Now to the President," SpacePolicyOnline.com, September 1, 2026, updated September 3, 2026, https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/house-clears-fy2027-cr-now-to-the-president/. ↑
  13. US Government Accountability Office, Defense Budget: Effects of Continuing Resolutions on Selected Activities and Programs Critical to DOD's National Security Mission, GAO-26-107065 (Washington, DC: GAO, January 21, 2026; reissued with revisions February 4, 2026), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-26-107065. ↑
  14. GAO, Effects of Continuing Resolutions. ↑
  15. Daniels, "Post-Midterm Outcomes." ↑
  16. Daniels, "Post-Midterm Outcomes." ↑
  17. Thomas Watkins, "Who's In and Who's Out of US Foreign Policy Circles After Republicans Lose the Midterms?" The National, November 5, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/11/05/us-reshuffle-foreign-policy-midterms/. ↑
  18. Eve Sampson, "Congressman Calls for Tougher Pentagon Oversight in Bid for Committee Chair," Military Times, November 4, 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/11/04/congressman-calls-for-tougher-pentagon-oversight-in-bid-for-committee-chair/. ↑
  19. Madeline Field, "The SPEED and FoRGED Acts Compared," Cogs of War, War on the Rocks, July 1, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/cogs-of-war/the-speed-and-forged-acts-compared/; House Armed Services Committee Republicans, "Rogers and Smith Introduce Legislation to Fundamentally Reform Defense Acquisition," press release, June 9, 2025, https://armedservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=5187. ↑
  20. House Armed Services Committee Democrats, "Smith Statement on House Vote for FY27 NDAA," press release, July 22, 2026, https://democrats-armedservices.house.gov/2026/7/smith-statement-on-house-vote-for-fy27-ndaa. ↑
  21. Sampson, "Tougher Pentagon Oversight." ↑
  22. House Armed Services Committee Democrats (@HASCDemocrats), statement by Ranking Member Adam Smith, X, November 4, 2026, https://x.com/HASCDemocrats/status/2118114271183667611. ↑
  23. Frank Wolfe, "All Future Systems Should Have Autonomy Features, Reed Says," Defense Daily, May 12, 2026, https://www.defensedaily.com/all-future-systems-should-have-autonomy-features-reed-says/congress/. ↑
  24. Clare Zhang, "Lawmakers Seek Next Steps on Golden Dome," FYI (American Institute of Physics), November 7, 2025, https://www.aip.org/fyi/lawmakers-seek-next-steps-on-golden-dome; Office of Senator Jack Reed, "Reed Sounds Alarm on Hegseth's Campaign to Politicize the U.S. Military," press release, June 18, 2026, https://www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/reed-sounds-alarm-on-hegseths-campaign-to-politicize-the-us-military. ↑
  25. Office of Senator Chris Coons, "Senators Coons, Reed Release Joint Statement on Cancellation of Ukrainian Weapons Shipments," press release, July 7, 2025, https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-coons-reed-release-joint-statement-on-cancellation-of-ukrainian-weapons-shipments. ↑
  26. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "SASC Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027," press release, June 11, 2026, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/sasc-completes-markup-of-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2027. ↑
  27. Madeline Field, "Reading through the Lines of the FY2027 NDAA," Cogs of War, War on the Rocks, July 16, 2026, https://warontherocks.com/cogs-of-war/reading-through-the-lines-of-the-fy2027-ndaa/. ↑
  28. Field, "Reading through the Lines." ↑
  29. Field, "Reading through the Lines." ↑
  30. Field, "Reading through the Lines." ↑
  31. Field, "Reading through the Lines." ↑
  32. Stephen Losey, "Lawmakers Vote to Keep Hold on E-3 Retirements, Grant Military 'Right to Repair,'" Air & Space Forces Magazine, June 5, 2026, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lawmakers-vote-awacs-retirements-military-right-to-repair-equipment/; Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, "Warren, Sheehy Statement on Right to Repair Win in Senate FY 27 NDAA," press release, June 15, 2026, https://www.warren.senate.gov/news/press-releases/warren-sheehy-statement-on-right-to-repair-win-in-senate-fy-27-ndaa/. ↑
  33. Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, "Warren, Sheehy Statement." ↑
  34. Phillip Walter Wellman, "Military Repair Restrictions Hurt Military Readiness and Waste Money, Senators Say," Stars and Stripes, May 21, 2026, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-05-21/warren-sheehy-right-to-repair-21740067.html. ↑
  35. Amy Mackinnon and Fabrice Deprez, "What Will a Democratic Congress Mean for Ukraine?" Financial Times, November 7, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/fac3a560-7845-4acf-9487-54ec8a445d74; Jim Costa et al. to Pete Hegseth and Russell T. Vought, letter, November 9, 2026, https://costa.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/costa-evo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/finalized-letter-to-omb-and-dod-on-fy26-ukraine-security-assistance.pdf. ↑
  36. Kyiv Post, "US Democrats Weigh $15B Ukraine Aid and Grid Backing," November 8, 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/89469. ↑
  37. Katola, "Democrats Took Congress Overnight."; Axios, "Trump Waives New Russia Sanctions in the 'National Interests'," October 17, 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/10/17/trump-russia-sanctions. ↑
  38. Mackinnon and Deprez, "Democratic Congress." ↑
  39. Mackinnon and Deprez, "Democratic Congress." ↑
  40. Field, "Reading through the Lines." ↑
  41. Michael D. Bopp et al., "Congressional Investigations After the 2026 Midterms: What the Results Mean for the Private Sector," client alert, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, November 6, 2026, https://gibsondunn.com/congressional-investigations-after-the-2026-midterms-what-the-results-mean-for-the-private-sector. ↑
  42. Bopp et al., "Congressional Investigations." ↑
  43. Bopp et al., "Congressional Investigations." ↑
  44. Bopp et al., "Congressional Investigations." ↑
  45. Caitlin Yilek and Kathryn Watson, "What Trump's Final 2 Years in Office Will Look Like with Democrats in Charge," CBS News, November 5, 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-congress-trump-final-2-years/. ↑
  46. Jon Harper, "Pentagon Requests More Than $20B for Strategic Capital Loan Program in 2027," DefenseScoop, April 6, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/04/06/pentagon-office-strategic-capital-loan-program-budget-increase/; Office of Strategic Capital, 10 U.S.C. § 149, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/149. ↑
  47. Harper, "Pentagon Requests More Than $20B." ↑
  48. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Defense Strategic Capital Credit Program," in Department of War Fiscal Year (FY) 2027 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide Justification Book, vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Department of War, April 2026), https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/budget_justification/pdfs/02_Procurement/PROC_OSC_PB_2027.pdf. ↑
  49. Robert Faturechi, "The White House Intervened to Get a $620 Million Deal for a Company Tied to Donald Trump Jr.," ProPublica, republished by WRAL, May 28, 2026, https://www.wral.com/news/ap/white-house-intervened-to-get-620-million-deal-for-company-tied-to-donald-trump-jr-vulcan-elements-propublica-may-2026/. ↑
  50. Matthew Rice, "Massie Loses Primary for Another Term in Congress Following Months of Battling with Trump," New York Sun, May 20, 2026, https://www.nysun.com/article/massie-loses-primary-for-another-term-in-congress-following-months-of-battling-with-trump; James Politi, "Republican Lawmaker Moves to Impeach US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth," Financial Times, November 9, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/ed09fc96-5ad5-4ff8-a8a9-900740c6fcbb; Abigail Hauslohner, James Politi, and Stefania Palma, "House Blocks Impeachment of US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth," Financial Times, November 10, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/38100c3c-af0d-440b-8350-823c5e8c80d9. ↑
  51. Daniels, "Post-Midterm Outcomes." ↑
  52. Daniels, "Unpacking the $1.5 Trillion." ↑
  53. Kelly Whitener, "Senate Voting Rules and Budget Reconciliation Explained (Part 1)," Center for Children and Families, Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy, January 25, 2021, https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2021/01/25/senate-voting-rules-and-budget-reconciliation-explained/. ↑
  54. Daniels, "Unpacking the $1.5 Trillion"; Department of War, Mandatory Budget Overview. ↑
  55. Congressional Research Service, Distinguishing Between Discretionary and Mandatory Spending, IF13124 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 21, 2025), EveryCRSReport.com, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF13124.html. ↑
  56. Insinna, "Ticking Clock." ↑
  57. Rich Gold et al., "Beyond the Midterms: Congress Faces Converging Year-End Deadlines," Holland & Knight Alert, October 9, 2026, https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/10/beyond-the-midterms-congress-faces-converging-year-end-deadlines. ↑
  58. Congressional Research Service, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Practices, R46595 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated March 27, 2025), EveryCRSReport.com, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46595.html. ↑
  59. GAO, Effects of Continuing Resolutions. ↑
  60. M. Smith, "House Clears FY2027 CR." ↑
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Jesse Nuese

Managing Partner

Luc Hillion

Emerging Technology Researcher

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